Generalizing Cooper-Kaplanis (1994), we estimate implied costs that reconcile international portfolios with InCAPM predictions. Costs depend on home- and host-country characteristics and on interactions; we estimate risk tolerance rather than pre-specifying it; and we control for currency risk, inflation hedging, fixed-interest investments, round-tripping and omitted countries. Estimates for developed markets are lower than reported before, but those for new markets are quite high: 2001-2004 inward shadow costs range from 0.01 %p.a. (US) to 37 (Indonesia). We find that equity home bias is related to a mixture of risks and frictions, such as information asymmetries, institutional factors and explicit costs.

Firms can grow through internal investment or through acquisition. While internal growth takes time, an acquisition provides cash flows immediately. The opportunity to grow internally affects the price of an acquisition as it is a fall-back option for the acquirer should negotiations break down. Assuming investors do not have full information about the time a firm requires to grow internally, acquirers earn positive returns before the announcement of an acquisition, and there are negative stock price reactions to acquisition announcements. This research provides predictions about how pre-announcement price run-up and negative announcement returns relate to integration costs and synergies from acquisition.

This paper uses an optimal auction approach to investigate the conditions under which uniform pricing in IPOs is optimal. We show that the optimality of a uniform price in IPOs depends crucially on whether the (optimal) allocation rule is restricted. These restrictions may stem from the retail investors' budget constraint and/or from the institutional investors' preferences. We show that the main determinant of the optimality of a uniform pricing rule is the existence and the shape of the retail investors' budget constraint. In contrast, institutional investors' preferences are shown to mainly affect the optimal allocation rule.

This study documents patterns of investor behavior around Finnish rights issues. We find that shareholders of issuing companies lost at least 9.9 million in aggregate from 1995 to 2002 by exercising rights too early, selling rights in the open market below their intrinsic value, or leaving rights unexercised. At the investor level, the losses are modest. For example, the median household investor suffered a loss of 135 from not exercising or selling the rights. Investors with small portfolios, inactive trading history, those who know neither of the official languages in Finland, or who are living abroad leave money on the table the most.

This paper considers share repurchases as the way long-term shareholders preserve their ability to use corporate information for speculative purposes when insider trading regulation is enforced. This use of corporate information increases the adverse selection losses of short-term shareholders. Thus, buy-back programs reduce their incentive to invest in stocks that back the most productive technology, leading to a socially inefficient equilibrium. It follows that insider trading should not be banned when share repurchases are allowed. More generally, the paper argues that the regulation of insider trading and repurchases can not be considered in isolation, and analyzes their interplay.

This study shows that U.S. individual investors hold under-diversified portfolios, where the level of under-diversification is greater among younger, low-income, less-educated, and less-sophisticated investors. The level of under-diversification is also correlated with investment choices that are consistent with over-confidence, trend-following behavior, and local bias. Furthermore, investors who over-weight stocks with higher volatility and higher skewness are less diversified. In contrast, there is little evidence that portfolio size or transaction costs constrains diversification. Under-diversification is costly to most investors, but a small subset of investors under-diversify because of superior information.

Using a large panel data set containing detailed information on educational attainments as well as financial and socioeconomic variables for individual investors, we show that economists are more likely to hold stocks than otherwise identical investors. First, we consider the change in stockholdings associated with (i) completing an economics education and (ii) an economist moving into the household. Second, we model stock market participation using a probit model with unobserved individual heterogeneity. Third, instrumental variables estimation allows us to identify the causal effect of an economics education on stock market participation. Throughout, we focus explicitly on the effect of a change in educational status on the likelihood of holding stocks.

The tendency to introduce anonymity into financial markets apparently runs counter to the theory supporting transparency. This paper studies the impact of pre-trade transparency on liquidity in a market where risk-averse traders accommodate the liquidity demand of noise traders. When some risk-averse investors become informed, an adverse selection problem ensues for the others, making them reluctant to supply liquidity. Hence the disclosure of traders' identities improves liquidity by mitigating adverse selection. However, informed investors are effective liquidity suppliers, as their adverse selection and inventory costs are minimized. With endogenous information acquisition, transparency reduces the number of informed investors, thus decreasing liquidity. The type of information that traders hold and the effectiveness of insider trading regulation are crucial to distinguish between equilibria.

I present evidence of inefficient information processing in equity markets by documenting that negative information withheld by securities analysts is incorporated in stock prices with a significant delay. I estimate the extent of the withheld negative information based on the proportion of analysts who stop revising their annual earnings forecasts. This measure predicts negative earnings surprises and negative price reaction around earnings announcements. It could also be used to generate profitable trading strategies. I show that institutions tend to sell their stock holdings as my measure of unreported negative news increases, thus ameliorating the mispricing.

We explore the influence of priming on financial decisions by reinforcing subjects' risk-seeking behavior under uncertainty and comparing it to behavior in control groups. We focused on professionals: commercial banks' investment advisors and accountants in CPA firms. Results indicate that priming affects subjects' risk attitudes and investment decisions. Professionals' decisions were affected more than undergraduates', suggesting they employ a more intuitive and less analytic approach in making their decisions. Our work is related to field-data research documenting correlations between returns (investors' decisions) and situational factors, (i.e., weather) by suggesting controlled tests of professionals' behavior vis-a-vis the complexity inherent in field data.

The views on financial liberalization are quite conflictive. Many argue that it triggers financial bubbles and crises. Others claim that financial liberalization allows markets to function properly and capital to move to its most profitable destination. The empirical evidence on these effects is not robust. This paper constructs a new comprehensive chronology of financial liberalization and shows that a key reason for the inconclusive evidence is that the effects of liberalization are time-varying. Financial liberalization is followed by large booms and busts only in the short run. In the long run institutions improve and financial markets tend to stabilize.

Extant research posits that cross-listing improves firms' access to lower cost external financing. But so far, there is scarce evidence that improved access to external funds through cross-listing contributes to higher firm growth. Documenting the relation between firm growth and cross-listing is critical because the presumption in prior research is that funds raised via cross-listing will be channeled towards potentially profitable projects. Using a sample of firms from thirty-seven countries that are cross-listed in the USA, we find a positive association between cross-listing and subsequent externally financed firm growth rates. However, we do not find that increases in externally financed firm growth after cross-listing vary systematically as a function of the home-country attributes of the cross-listed firms. Overall, our results provide new and direct evidence on the impact of cross-listing on the firm growth rates.

We study the effects of a market-wide short-sale constraint in a dynamic economy with heterogeneous beliefs. Imposing the constraint reduces the stock price if the optimistic investors' intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) is less than one and increases the stock price if the optimist's IES is greater than one. In calibrated examples, the optimist's market price of risk falls and the interest rate rises when the constraint binds. Imposing the constraint leads to a higher stock volatility if the optimist's IES is less than one and a lower stock volatility if the IES is greater than one.

I study the determinants of changes in credit spreads for U.S. dollar denominated domestic and foreign sovereign bonds using fundamentals specified by structural models to separate spreads into their credit and non-credit components. I find that the non-default portions of spreads have a component that is common for each type of debt. Further, using a vector autoregressive model, I find that domestic spreads are related to the lagged component of sovereign spreads. I also find that some proxies for liquidity are related to the common components, suggesting a liquidity-based explanation for the common component not identified by previous research.

Large U.S. banks dramatically increased their capitalization during the 1990s, to the highest levels in more than 50 years. We document this buildup of capital and evaluate several potential motivations. Our results support the hypothesis that regulatory innovations in the early 1990s weakened conjectural government guarantees and enhanced bank counterparties' incentives to monitor and price default risk. We find no evidence that a bank holding company's (BHC's) market capitalization increases with its asset volatility prior to 1994. Thereafter, the data display a strong cross-sectional relation between capitalization and asset risk.